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ARTICLE

THANKS, BUT No THANKS: STATE
SUPREME COURTS' ATTEMPTS TO
REMOVE THEMSELVES FROM THE
FEDERAL HABEAS EXHAUSTION
REQUIREMENT
t

Kirk J. Henderson
INTRODUCTION

A state prisoner who wants to file a federal habeas corpus petition must first exhaust his or her remedies in state court.' In the abstract, this is a simple enough concept. The details of what constitutes an exhausted claim, however, have been and continue to be unclear.
Prior to 1999, the federal circuits were split on whether the exhaustion requirement obligated prisoners to file for discretionary review in state supreme court.2 The Supreme Court attempted to resolve this conflict in O'Sullivan v. Boerckel by holding that discretionary review is required to fulfill the exhaustion requirement.
O'Sullivan, however, allowed for the possibility that discretionary
review may not always be necessary. At least two state supreme
courts prior to O'Sullivan and one since have tried to remove themselves from the exhaustion requirement. In an effort to conserve limited resources and to make the discretionary review system more
t Assistant Public Defender in the Appellate Division of the Law Office of the Public
Defender of Allegheny County, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Adjunct Professor of Law, University
of Pittsburgh School of Law; B.A., Allegheny College; J.D., Vanderbilt University. The views
expressed in this Article do not necessarily reflect the policies, opinions, or views of the Law
Office of the Public Defender of Allegheny County or of any other member of that Office.
I would like to thank my fellow public defenders, especially those in the Appellate Division, for the years of advice, collaboration, and perseverance; Shelley Stark for sharing her
expertise on habeas law; Barry Friedman for sparking my interest in habeas law a decade ago;
and Kristin Henderson for support and encouragement while I wrote this Article.
' See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1998).
2 Compare Silverburg v. Evitts, 993 F.2d 124, 126-27 (6th Cir. 1993) (requiring state
supreme court discretionary review to exhaust a claim), Jennison v. Goldsmith, 940 F.2d 1308,
1311 (9th Cir. 1991) (same), McNeeley v. Arave, 842 F.2d 230, 231 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (same), and Richardson v. Procunier, 762 F.2d 429, 431-32 (5th Cir. 1985) (same), with
Boerckel v. O'Sullivan, 135 F.3d 1194, 1199 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that a claim is exhausted
even if it was not presented on discretionary review to a state supreme court), rev'd, 526 U.S.
838 (1999), Dony v. Erickson, 32 F.3d 381, 384 (8th Cir. 1994) (same), and Buck v. Green,
743 F.2d 1567, 1569 (11th Cir. 1984).
3 526 U.S. 838 (1999).
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manageable, other supreme courts may try to follow the examples of
these states. Four Justices in O'Sullivan took great pains to note that,
in their opinion, the Court left this scenario an open question for later
resolution. As federal courts try to resolve this question and as state
supreme courts try to remove themselves from the exhaustion requirement, the policies underlying the exhaustion doctrine will have
to be analyzed and the interests of the federal courts, the state court
systems, and the state prisoners will have to be weighed to determine
whether to allow state prisoners to bypass discretionary review when
the state gives them that option.
This Article addresses this issue by examining those policies and
balancing the interests. Part I examines the O'Sullivan decision-the
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions. Part II reviews the
long but successful campaign of the Arizona Supreme Court to remove itself from the exhaustion requirement and analyzes the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's recent attempt to excuse itself from the exhaustion requirement. The Article then turns, in Part m, to the various considerations underlying the exhaustion doctrine and how these
affect the interests of federal courts, state courts, and prisoners. Part
IV argues that balancing these considerations leads to the conclusion
that a state supreme court should be permitted to exclude its discretionary review from the exhaustion requirement when it makes an
explicit statement that it does not want it to be included and when the
state's own law defines an issue as finally litigated without supreme
court discretionary review.
I. O'SuLLIvAN v. BOERCKEL: SETTING A RULE OR CREATING AN
EXCEPTION?
In 1999, the United States Supreme Court, in O'Sullivan v.
Boerckel, addressed whether a state prisoner seeking federal habeas
corpus relief must first petition for discretionary review in a state supreme court.4 The Court held that "state prisoners must give the state
courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review
process. ' 5 When the "established appellate review process" for a
state includes the possibility of discretionary review in the state's supreme court, the prisoner must provide that court with the opportunity
to hear the case, even when it is unlikely to grant review.6 The Court
grounded its decision in the language of the federal habeas corpus
statute and in its concerns about federal court comity with state
courts.

4 See id. at 842-43.
5 Id. at 845.
6

See id. at 845-47.
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Pursuant to the habeas statute, "[a]n applicant shall not be
deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the
State... if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any
available procedure, the question presented. ' 7 Discretionary review
in a state supreme court clearly is an "available procedure. ' 8 The
Court acknowledged that Boerckel had no right to have the Illinois

Supreme Court actually hear his case, but only a right to ask that

court to take his case.9 Turning to the habeas statute, the Court stated
that Boerckel "does have a 'right... to raise' his claims before that
court. That is all § 2254(c) requires."' Because Boerckel had the
right to raise his claims before the Illinois Supreme Court, the fact
that he did not have a right to have those claims reviewed by the court
was immaterial.11
The Court, however, based its decision more firmly on notions of
comity, 12 which requires federal courts to give the state courts "one
full opportunity" to review the conviction." The Court said that the
"one full opportunity" requirement is justified "[b]ecause the exhaustion doctrine is designed to give the state courts a full and fair opportunity to resolve federal constitutional claims before those claims are
presented to the federal courts." 14 ilinois's "established, normal appellate review procedure" consists of a two-tiered system where a
7 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (1994).
O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845. Discretionary review in the Illinois Supreme Court, the
procedure in question in O'Sullivan, is not an alternative to the standard review process, but
instead "is a normal, simple, and established part of the State's appellate review process." Id.
The Court distinguished cases where it held that a petitioner need not pursue "alternatives to the
standard review process ... where the state courts have not provided relief through those remedies in the past." Id. at 844 (citing Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 249-50 (1971) (per
curiam)). In Wilwording, the Court reversed the Eighth Circuit, which had held that a prisoner
must file "any of a number of possible alternatives to state habeas including 'a suit for injunction, a writ of prohibition, or mandamus or a declaratory judgment in the state courts,' or perhaps other relief under the State Administrative Procedure Act." Wilwording v. Swenson, 404
U.S. at 249-50 (quoting Wilwording v. Swenson, 439 F.2d 1331, 1336 (8th Cir. 1971)). The
O'Sullivan Court also noted that prisoners need not file repetitive petitions even though this is
an "available procedure." O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 844 (citing Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443,
447 (1953)).
9 See O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845.
1o Id.
11 Seeid.
12 The Court summarized its comity jurisprudence:
State courts, like federal courts, are obliged to enforce federal law. Comity
thus dictates that when a prisoner alleges that his continued confinement for a state
court conviction violates federal law, the state courts should have the first opportunity to review this claim and provide any necessary relief. This rule of comity reduces friction between the state and federal court systems by avoiding the "unseem[iness]" of a federal district court's overturning a state court conviction without
the state courts having had an opportunity to correct the constitutional violation in
the first instance.
Id. at 844-45 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
'" Id. at 845.
8

14 Id.
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defendant can first appeal to the Appellate Court of Illinois and then
seek discretionary review in the Illinois Supreme Court.15 In these
circumstances, the Court said, "[c]omity . . . dictates that Boerckel
use the State's established appellate
1 6 review procedures before he presents his claims to a federal court."
The established appellate review procedures in Illinois call for
the supreme court to grant review only in certain cases.' 7 The
O'Sullivan Court did not accept the proposition that the Illinois rule
governing the exercise of discretionary review sufficiently delineated
what claims would be considered. 18 Instead, the Court reasoned that a
better reading of the rule was that the Illinois Supreme Court had
limited resources and would use those resources only on "questions of
broad significance."' 9 The Illinois Supreme Court, in other words,
could still decide on a case-by-case basis whether to hear any criminal
case presented to it and thus review was not "unavailable. 2 0 Therefore, the Court concluded, "[b]y requiring state prisoners to give the
Illinois Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve constitutional errors
in the first instance, the rule we announce2 1today serves the comity
interests that drive the exhaustion doctrine."
The majority did concede that the "one full opportunity" rule
could actually be contrary to the comity interests that form the basis
for the exhaustion doctrine.22 Requiring petitions for discretionary
review in state supreme courts of every criminal case that could be
headed to federal court may create an "unwelcome burden" on the
state supreme courts.2 3 The Court emphasized that the O'Sullivan
decision does not mean that any specific state remedy must be pursued when a state has provided that a particular remedy is unavailable.24 If the state makes a procedure unavailable, the federal courts
must honor that rule.25 The Court concluded by stating that "the
IS See id. at 843.
16

Id.at 845.

17 See id. at 843. An Illinois Supreme Court rule provides the following guidelines for the

court to use when exercising its discretion:
The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be considered: the general importance of the question presented; the existence of a conflict between the decision
sought to be reviewed and a decision of the Supreme Court, or of another division of
the Appellate Court; the need for the exercise of the Supreme Court's supervisory
authority; and the final or interlocutory character of the judgment sought to be reviewed.
ILL. Sup. Cr. R. 315(a).
18 See O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845-46.
'9 Id. at 846.
20 See id.
21
22

id.

See id. at 847.
23 Id.
2 See id.
2 See id.

20001

THANKS BUT NO THANKS

creation of a discretionary review system does not, without more,
make review in the Illinois Supreme Court unavailable. 2 6 The Court
did not elaborate, however, on what makes a procedure "unavailable"
or what "more" is required to make discretionary review "unavailable."
In a concurring opinion, Justice Souter noted that the Court left
open the possibility that a clear statement by a state could remove
discretionary review from the exhaustion requirement. 27 Justice
Souter speculated as to "whether we should construe the exhaustion
doctrine to force a State, in effect, to rule on discretionary review applications when the State has made it plain that it does not wish to
require such applications before its petitioners may seek federal habeas relief."28 Relying more on notions of comity than a strict reading of the habeas statute, Justice Souter argued that the Court was
leaving open the possibility that a prisoner could skip an available
state remedy if the state has "identified the procedure as outside the
standard review process and has29plainly said that it need not be sought
for the purpose of exhaustion.'
Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented on the grounds
that Boerckel could have proceeded in federal court without application to the Illinois Supreme Court.30 Justice Breyer's dissent, like
Justice Souter's concurrence, commented that the majority left open
the possibility that a state may deem its procedures exhausted without
31
the application for discretionary review in the state supreme court.
Relying upon the comity underpinnings of the exhaustion doctrine,
Justice Breyer asked, "[i]f the State does not want the prisoner to seek
discretionary state review (or if it does not care), why should that
failure matter to federal habeas law?" 32 Discretionary supreme court
review procedures imply that states with such procedures only want

2

Id. at 848.

2
28

See id. at 849-50 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. at 849. As an example of how a state might be able'to do this, Justice Souter re-

ferred to an order of the South Carolina Supreme Court, which disavowed the need for a litigant
to seek discretionary review in the state supreme court for purposes of exhausting the claim in
federal court. Id. (quoting Re Exhaustion of State Remedies in Criminal and Post-Conviction
Relief Cases, 471 S.E.2d 454 (S.C. 1990)). See infra note 83 for the text of the order.
'9 O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 850 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter followed this statement by concluding: "It is not obvious that either comity or precedent requires otherwise." Id.
" Justice Stevens wrote a dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, criticizing the
majority for confusing the doctrines of exhaustion and procedural default. After a lengthy discussion of these issues, Justice Stevens concluded that Boerckel had not procedurally defaulted
his claim because he had pursued all of his issues through his appeal as of right to the intermediate appellate court in Illinois. See id. at 850-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
31 See id. at 864 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[A] federal habeas court should respect a State's
desire that prisoners not file petitions for discretionary review, where the State has expressed
that desire clearly.").
32 Id. at 862 (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32, 751 (1991)) (emphasizing comity interest in federal habeas).
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prisoners to seek discretionary review in unusual circumstances.33
Statistics from state supreme courts also reflect that the supreme
courts actually take very few cases on discretionary review. 4 Hence,
these states either do not want a flood of petitions for discretionary
review, or they must not care whether these defendants seek review in
the supreme court. The dissenters did "see cause for optimism" in
Justice Souter's concurrence and suggested that, in light of
O'Sullivan, a prisoner must now file for discretionary review unless a
state clearly expresses its desire that this process is unnecessary.35
O'Sullivan left open the question of whether and how a state
could remove itself from the exhaustion requirement. To date, at least
three states have clearly attempted to remove themselves from the
requirement. 36 Arizona has been successful through the Ninth Circuit
in accomplishing this task. One federal district court has reluctantly
upheld Pennsylvania's attempt,3 7 and South Carolina's effort has not
yet been tested in court.
33 See id. at 862-63 (citing examples from four states).
3

See id. at 863 (citing statistics from 11 states).

35 See id. at 864. Justice Breyer said that the majority's approach creates a presumption

that discretionary review must be sought, but that presumption can be overcome with a clear
statement from the state that discretionary view is unnecessary. See id. Justice Breyer cited to
South Carolina's rule as such a clear statement. See id. (citing Re Exhaustion of State Remedies
in Criminal and Post-Conviction Relief Cases, 471 S.E.2d 454 (S.C. 1990)); see also infra note
83. Justice Breyer, however, suggested that the presumption should be reversed: a state should
be presumed not to want prisoners to seek discretionary review in every case for exhaustion
purposes unless it makes a clear statement that it wants to be given the opportunity to hear each
case. See O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 864 (Breyer, J., dissenting). At a minimum, Justice Breyer
said that Justice Souter's suggested presumption "would still help." Id.
36 A fourth state, Kentucky, potentially falls into this category. In Freeman v. Commonwealth, 697 S.W.2d 133, 134 (Ky. 1985), the Kentucky Supreme Court sanctioned an appellate
public advocate for filing a motion for discretionary review in the supreme court that the court
termed "patently groundless." The attorney argued that he filed the motion "to preserve [his
client's] right to pursue a writ of habeas corpus in Federal Court after state remedies had been
exhausted." Id. The court responded, "[t]he decision of the Court of Appeals denying the [motion] was final state action, without a useless motion for discretionary review." Id. The court
concluded by offering legal advice for the state prisoner: "[here would be no legitimate reasons for Freeman to pursue this matter further in Federal Court. It would be a further waste of
court time." Id.
Given the posture of this case, whether this is a clear statement of the court's desire to be
removed from the exhaustion requirement is a determination that would have to be made by a
federal court. How to determine what constitutes a sufficiently clear statement by a state that it
does not want prisoners to seek discretionary review solely for exhaustion purposes is beyond
the scope of this Article. Because the statements of Arizona, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina
are unambiguous, they are the focus of this Article.
37 See Blasi v. Attorney Gen., 120 F. Supp. 2d 451 (M.D. Pa. 2000). The Blasi
court
generally found that Pennsylvania's attempt to remove itself was contrary to the exhaustion
requirement of the federal habeas statute, which is interpreted by the federal courts, not state
courts. See id. at 468-69. The court questioned whether a state court has the authority to waive
the exhaustion requirement. See id. at 469. Nonetheless, the court upheld Pennsylvania's attempt because of the language of O'Sullivan, see supra Part I, and because of the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), cert. denied,
120 S. Ct. 1996 (2000); see infra notes 62-74 and accompanying text. The Blasi court did not
discuss the other factors analyzed in the balance of this Article, see infra Part MII.
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II. TiE ATrEMPTS OF STATE SUPREME COURTS TO REMOVE
THEMSELVES FROM THE EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT

Arizona's decade-long experience provides insight into how a
federal court may rule on a state supreme court's attempts to remove
itself from the federal habeas requirement. After initially rejecting
Arizona's attempt, the Ninth Circuit changed its course after
O'Sullivan. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's recent pronouncement that it is exempt from the habeas exhaustion requirement will
provide a backdrop to discuss the various factors that should be considered when a federal court considers this issue.
A. The Arizona Supreme Court's Perseveranceand the Ninth
Circuit'sEventualAcquiescence
The Ninth Circuit has been the only circuit court to deal with this
issue since O'Sullivan. Prior to O'Sullivan, the Arizona Supreme
Court and the Ninth Circuit were engaged in a turf battle over
whether petitions for review in the supreme court were necessary to
exhaust prisoner claims in state court. Despite its ambiguity,
O'Sullivan has changed the landscape in the Ninth Circuit.
The battle began in 1989, when the Arizona Supreme Court held
in State v. Sandon- 8 that state remedies had been exhausted after review by the Arizona Court of.Appeals. In that case, Sandon argued
twelve issues in his appeal to the court of appeals, Arizona's intermediate appellate court.39 He then filed a petition in the Arizona Supreme Court requesting review on only three of the twelve issues.40
The supreme court declined to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction
to hear the case.4 ' Next, Sandon filed a federal habeas corpus petition, which was dismissed without prejudice because the federal court
determined that the eight issues raised had not been presented to the
Arizona Supreme Court, and thus had not been exhausted in state
to attempt to
court. 42 Consequently, Sandon returned to state court
43
present those claims to the Arizona Supreme Court.
The Arizona Supreme Court noted that all defendants in Arizona
have a state constitutional right to an appeal. 4 Only defendants who
have received the death penalty or life imprisonment have a right to
appeal to the supreme court; review in all other cases is at the court's
" 777 P.2d 220 (Ariz. 1989) (en banc).
39 See id. at 220.
40 See id. The court characterized Sandon's choice of issues as "selecting three issues that
he believed merited our consideration, and that were most likely to result in a grant of review."

Id.

41

See id.

42

See id. at 221.

43 See id.

44 See id. (citing ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 24).
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discretion. 45 The court, clearly stating its views on what constitutes
exhaustion in the Arizona courts, said, "'[o]nce the defendant has
been given the appeal to which he has a right, state remedies have
been exhausted. A;4 The court therefore dismissed the petition.47
Despite the views of the Arizona Supreme Court, two years later
in Jennison v. Goldsmith,48 the Ninth Circuit held that exhaustion of
state remedies was a question of federal law and could not be made
by the state court. Jennison had not presented his claims to the Arizona Supreme Court before filing a federal habeas corpus petition.49
The federal district court dismissed the petition because it found Jennison's failure to present those issues to the supreme court rendered
them unexhausted. 50 Jennison argued that under Sandon and its
predecessor State v. Shattuck,5 1 review in the Arizona Supreme Court
was unnecessary for exhaustion purposes.
The Ninth Circuit lectured the Arizona Supreme Court on the
meaning of exhaustion: "The Arizona Supreme Court has confused
review as of right under state law with 'the right under the law of the
state to raise' an issue within the meaning of the federal habeas statute." 52 Even though Jennison did not have a right to have the supreme court hear his case, he did have a right to present all of his issues to the supreme court for it to consider whether to hear any of
those issues.53 Under the plain language of the habeas statute, the
Ninth Circuit held that Jennison had not exhausted his state remedies
because he still had the right to ask the supreme court to hear his
case. 54 The court distinguished its holding from a scenario where a
45 See id.
46 Id. (quoting State v. Shattuck, 684 P.2d 154, 157 (Ariz. 1984)). The court also stated

that when counsel has followed the state's procedures, "the case in the Arizona courts is over"
after review in the Court of Appeals. Id. The court continued: "The issues decided by the Court
of Appeals, even though they had not been presented to this Court in a petition for review, are
no longer open to substantive review in this Court or in any other court in Arizona ....
State
remedies have been exhausted." Id.
47 See id.
48 940 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
49 See id. at 1309.
50 See id.
5' 684 P.2d 154 (Ariz. 1984). Shattuck concerned the role of counsel in appeals when
counsel files a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), which outlined the
process for appointed counsel to follow when he or she could not find a meritorious issue to
raise on appeal.
52 Jennison, 940 F.2d at 1310 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988)); see supra text accompanying note 7 (quoting language of § 2254(c)).
53 See Jennison,940 F.2d at 1310.
'
See id. at 1311. The court also said that Arizona's rule would streamline the habeas
process and it would lighten the caseload of the Arizona Supreme Court, which has limited
resources and cannot consider petitions of all merely seeking to exhaust state remedies. See id.
The court rejected these concerns because of comity considerations (the Arizona Supreme Court
has a duty to protect federal constitutional rights) and the scarce resources of the federal judiciary that may be conserved by requiring a petition to the supreme court before federal court
intervention. See id.
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state supreme court declares that it will never exercise its discretionary review or that it has limited its discretion to "clearly defined
situations not present in the case submitted to the federal court. 55
Because these distinctions were not present
in Arizona, Jennison had
56
not exhausted his state court remedies.
In 1998, the Arizona Supreme Court revisited the issue in Moreno v. Gonzalez.57 The Ninth Circuit had certified several questions
for the Arizona Supreme Court to consider, among them whether a
petition for review in the supreme court is an "appeal" under the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.58 The Arizona Supreme Court
held that review in that court "is discretionary, not an appeal."'59 Citing to Sandon and Shattuck, the court said that "[o]nce a defendant
has exercised his right to direct appeal, further review in this court
should 'not be sought as a matter of course."' 60 The court said that
despite the Ninth Circuit's holding in Jennison, it "would not have
encouraged discretionary filings" by defining review in the supreme
court as being included as part of the appeal as of right.6 1
The Ninth Circuit still seemed unmoved by the repeated attempts
of the Arizona Supreme Court to remove itself from the federal exhaustion requirement. 62 O'Sullivan, however, forced the Ninth Circuit to revisit this issue and ultimately to reverse itself in Swoopes v.
Sublett.63 Swoopes sought to raise six issues in his federal habeas
petition; the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that all
but one of the claims were unexhausted in the Arizona courts and
were procedurally defaulted. 64 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari, reversed, and remanded for further consideration in
light of O'Sullivan.65
On remand the Ninth Circuit noted that review still was "available" in the Arizona Supreme Court on these claims and this, at first
5S Id. at 1312 n.7.
See id. at 1312.

7 962 P.2d 205 (Ariz. 1998) (en bane).
58See id. at 206-07.
59 Id. at 207.
6 Id. at 207-08 (quoting ARiz. R. CRIM. P. 31.19 cmt. to 1983 amend.). The court compared its discretionary review system to that of the United States Supreme Court. See id. at 208.
61 Id. at 208.
62 See Swoopes v. Sublett, No. 94-16033, 1998 WL 657711 (9th Cir. Sept. 3, 1998), vacated, 527 U.S. 1001 (1999), on remand, 196 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 120 S. Ct. 1996 (2000). In the initial Swoopes opinion, the Ninth Circuit, despite Shattuck, Sandon, and Moreno, found that Swoopes had not exhausted his state remedies when he
failed to present his claim to the Arizona Supreme Court. See id. at *1.
63 196 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1996 (2000).
6 See id. at 1008 n.1, 1008-09. Swoopes sought to raise these six issues in a variety of
ways in Arizona courts. See id. at 1009. Relevant to this discussion, several claims were
deemed to be unexhausted because they had not been presented to the Arizona Supreme Court.

See id.
6 See Swoopes v. Sublett, 527 U.S. 1001 (1999). The Court took this action one week
after O'Sullivan was decided. See id.
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blush, met the requirement of O'Sullivan that claims had to have been
presented there first.66 The Ninth Circuit, however, focused on the
exhaustion exception announced in O'Sullivan. It turned to the
Court's language that a remedy made unavailable by a state need not
be exhausted, though a system of discretionary review "without
more" does not make review "unavailable. 6 8 In an attempt to discern
the meaning of "without more," the Ninth Circuit turned to Justice
Souter's concurrence and his suggestion that it means a state procedure identified by the state as being "outside [of] the standard review
process and [that it] has plainly said... need not be sought for the
purpose of exhaustion." 9 The court reasoned that Arizona had
"plainly" characterized state supreme court review as outside of the
standard review process in Shattuck, Sandon, and Moreno.70 Because
the Arizona Supreme Court had announced that discretionary review
is unnecessary to exhaust state remedies, the court concluded that discretionary review "is a remedy that is 'unavailable' within the meaning of O'Sullivan."7 1 Noting that O'Sullivan requires a prisoner to
"give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process, 'T2 the Ninth Circuit credited the Arizona Supreme Court's assertion that its "complete round" does not
include discretionary supreme court review. 73 Hence, Jennison's inclusion of state supreme court review in its definition of exhaustion
was overruled. 74
The Ninth Circuit has thus changed its position on the necessity
of discretionary state supreme court review. Although it initially
looked to the plain language of the habeas statute and found that "any
available procedure" included discretionary review in a state supreme
court, its new position is in line with Justice Souter's view that a state
may explicitly remove a procedure from its standard review process
and, hence, from the exhaustion requirement. The repeated declaration of the Arizona Supreme Court that its discretionary review is not

66

See Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1009-10 ("Although review before the Arizona Supreme

Court is discretionary, it is 'available' under O'Sullivan; thus, at least facially, Arizona prisoners
are not relieved of their duty to file an appeal with that court.").
67 See id.
68 Id. at 1009.
69 Id. at 1009-10 (quoting O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 850 (1999) (Souter, J.,
concurring)).
70 See id. at 1010.
71 Id.
72 Id. (quoting O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845).
73 See id. (citing Moreno v. Gonzalez, 962 P.2d 205, 207-08 (Ariz. 1998) (en banc)).
74 See id. at 1011. The Ninth Circuit noted that Jennison was in accord with O'Sullivan to
the extent that Jennison created a rule that the existence of a discretionary review procedure in
and of itself does not render that procedure "unavailable." See id.
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part of the state review procedures for habeas purposes has finally
been accepted by the Ninth Circuit.
This decision by the Ninth Circuit, however, was far from a
foregone conclusion. The court certainly could have read O'Sullivan
to require state prisoners to file for discretionary review in the Arizona Supreme Court. Discretionary review before the supreme court
still is "available," and O'Sullivan requires exhaustion of all "available" procedures that are part of a "complete round" of the state court
system. Despite Shattuck, Sandon, and Moreno, discretionary review
certainly could have been interpreted to be part of a complete round
of the state system. Some defendants still raise federal constitutional
issues when filing for review in the Arizona Supreme Court, and the
court on discretionary review will decide federal constitutional issues.7 5 For these prisoners, supreme court review is part of the "complete round" of Arizona's system.
The Ninth" Circuit, consistent with O'Sullivan, could have held
that an "unavailable" procedure would have to be literally unavailable
for a particular prisoner or for particular unexhausted claims. This
interpretation certainly can be supported by O'Sullivan, which requires "more" than the existence of a discretionary review system to
render supreme court review unavailable.7 6 A pronouncement by a
state supreme court that it would prefer not to review claims merely
for exhaustion purposes but would nonetheless consider these claims
if presented
with them does not make this procedure literally "un77
available.
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit eschewed a literal interpretation
of "available" and instead focused on the comity rationale for the exhaustion requirement. More specifically, the court reasoned that

75 See, e.g., State v. Garcia-Contreras, 953 P.2d 536, 538 (Ariz. 1998) (en banc) (holding,
under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, that a defendant
has a right to be present at his or her own trial); State v. Riggs, 942 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Ariz.
1997) (en banc) (holding that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution
guarantee the right to confront adverse witnesses).
76 See O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 847-48; see also supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text
for a discussion of this portion of O'Sullivan.
77 Following this rationale, the Ninth Circuit could have reaffirmed its holding in Jennison
in light of O'Sullivan. In Jennison, the court noted that discretionary supreme court review
might be "unavailable" if the supreme court never exercised its discretion or if it articulated
"clearly defined situations" when it would not exercise its discretion in the claims eventually
presented to federal court. Jennison v. Goldsmith, 940 F.2d 1308, 1312 n.7 (1991) (per curiam)..
Because Arizona did not make the procedure literally unavailable, O'Sullivan could have been
read as changing nothing in Jennison. Cf. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir.
1999) ("Thus, to the extent that Jennison announced that the creation of a state discretionary
review system does not itself make a remedy unavailable under federal habeas law, it is fully in
accord with O'Sullivan").
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states should be permitted to regulate their criminal justice system
with little direction from the federal courts.78
The shift in Ninth Circuit law since O'Sullivan demonstrates the
potential sea of change that O'Sullivan permits. Its holding points the
direction for other state supreme courts to attempt to remove themselves from the exhaustion requirement.
B. The PennsylvaniaSupreme Court'sAttempt to Remove Itselffrom
the ExhaustionRequirement
In the wake of O'Sullivan, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued an order expressing its view that supreme court discretionary
review need not be sought to fulfill the exhaustion requirement for
federal habeas corpus purposes.79 In the first paragraph of the twoparagraph order, the court took judicial notice of the Pennsylvania
process involving discretionary review before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The court stated:
we hereby recognize that the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
reviews criminal as well as civil appeals. Further, review of
a final order of the Superior Court is not a matter of right, but
of sound judicial discretion, and an appeal to this Court will
only be allowed when there are special and important reasons
therefor. Further, we hereby recognize that criminal and
post-conviction relief litigants have petitioned and do routinely petition this Court for allowance of appeal upon the
Superior Court's denial of relief in order to exhaust all available state remedies for purposes of federal habeas corpus relief. o
The court then indicated that neither defendants on direct appeal nor
petitioners seeking post-conviction relief need to file a petition for
allowance of appeal in the supreme court to exhaust Pennsylvania's

78

The Ninth Circuit "[riecogniz[ed] that 'each state is entitled to formulate its own sys-

tem of post-conviction relief, and ought to be able to administer that system free of federal
interference."' Sivoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010 (quoting Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th
Cir. 1999)). This is a drastic change from Jennison, which held that "[p]etitioner's contention
that the law of the state determines whether remedies are exhausted for federal habeas purposes
is ... misplaced. The state may prescribe what remedies are available to a prisoner ... but
federal law requires that any remedies made available by the state must be exhausted." Jennison, 940 F.2d at 1311 n.4.
79 See In re Exhaustion of State Remedies in Criminal and Post-Conviction Cases, Order
of the Sup. Ct. of Pa., Western District, No. 218 Jud. Admin., Docket No. I (May 9, 2000),
reprinted in PA. R. App. P. 1114 publisher's note (West 2000) [hereinafter Pennsylvania Exhaustion Order].
so Id. (citation omitted).
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remedies. 81 A determination of a claim on the merits by the superior
court suffices. The order continued:
In recognition of the above, we hereby declare that in all appeals from criminal convictions or post-conviction relief
matters, a litigant shall not be required to petition for rehearing or allowance of appeal following an adverse decision by
the Superior Court in order to be deemed to have exhausted
all available state remedies respecting a claim of error. When
a claim has been presented to the Superior Court, or to the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, and relief has been denied in
a final order, the litigant shall be deemed to have exhausted
all available 82state remedies for purposes of federal habeas
corpus relief.
This order, which is similar to both the South Carolina Supreme
Court order cited in Justice Souter's concurrence and Justice Breyer's
dissent in O'Sullivan8 3 and the pronouncements of the Arizona Supreme Court, 'indicates the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's preference
that it be removed from the state's exhaustion requirement. It does
not make supreme court review technically "unavailable" for state

prisoners or for specific claims but merely proclaims that, for purposes of federal habeas corpus, Pennsylvania's state court remedies
are exhausted without discretionary review in the supreme court.

In Pennsylvania, defendants have a constitutional right to a direct
appeal of a criminal conviction.84 Review in the Pennsylvania Su81 See id.
2 id.
8 See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 847, 849, 864 (1999). In the two-paragraph
order, the South Carolina Supreme Court took judicial notice of the state court appellate proceedings and then noted that, as far as it was concerned, a petition for review in the supreme
court was unnecessary to exhaust South Carolina's remedies. See Re Exhaustion of State
Remedies in Criminal and Post-Conviction Relief Cases, 471 S.E.2d 454 (S.C. 1990). That
order reads as follows:
In 1979, the General Assembly created the South Carolina Court of Appeals
for the purpose of reducing South Carolina's appellate backlog. The Court of Appeals reviews criminal as well as civil appeals, and this Court reviews its decisions
by writ of certiorari only where special reasons justify the exercise of that power.
We recognize that criminal and post-conviction relief litigants have routinely
petitioned this Court for writ of certiorari upon the Court of Appeals' denial of relief
in order to exhaust all available state remedies. We therefore declare that in all appeals from criminal convictions or post-conviction relief matters, a litigant shall not
be required to petition for rehearing and certiorari following an adverse decision of
the Court of Appeals in order to be deemed to have exhausted all available state
remedies respecting a claim of error. Rather, when the claim has been presented to
the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, and relief has been denied, the litigant
shall be deemed to have exhausted all available state remedies. This order shall become effective immediately.
Id. (footnote omitted).
84 See PA. CONST. art.V, § 9.
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preme Court on most cases,85 however, is at the court's discretion. 6
Comparing its discretion to that exercised by the United States Supreme Court in certiorari considerations," the court has provided a
list of nebulous criteria for deciding whether to grant allowance to
appeal.88 Nothing in these criteria provides any clear guidance about
whether any particular issue may or may not be granted allowance to
appeal or whether any particular defendant may be allowed to appeal
to the supreme court.
Pennsylvania's post-conviction procedures allow a petitioner to
file aetition in the trial court8 9 and then an appeal to the superior
court.90 Review by the supreme court is discretionary. 91 In post-

conviction proceedings, a claim that already had been considered on
direct appeal by the highest appellate court in which a defendant had
a right to appeal is considered to have been "previously litigated." 92
85 The court hears appeals as of right directly from the trial court in death penalty cases.
See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 722(4) (West 1998); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(h)
(West 1998). On the other hand, the court does not have jurisdiction to hear appeals from superior court involving the discretionary aspect of a defendant's sentence. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 9781(a) (West 1998).
16 See PA. R. APP. P. 1114 ("[R]eview of a final order of the Superior Court... is not a
matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and an appeal will be allowed only when there
are special and important reasons therefor."); see also Commonwealth v. Byrd, 657 A.2d 961,
962 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (citing PA. R. APP. P. 1114).
87 See PA.R. APP.P. 1114 note.
88 See id. The court laid out criteria that, "while neither controlling nor fully measuring
the discretion of the supreme court, indicate the character of the reasons which will be considered." Id. The criteria are (1)the issue is one of first impression in the supreme court; (2) the
lower appellate court has decided a question "probably not in accord with applicable decisions"
of either the Pennsylvania or the United States Supreme Courts; (3) the decision below conflicts
with the other state appellate court on this same issue; (4) the supreme court must exercise its
power to supervise the state courts to correct a decision of a lower court that "has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings" that supreme court review is
necessary; and (5) "the question involves an issue of immediate public importance" requiring
the exercise of the court's "extraordinary jurisdiction." Id. The supreme court's internal operating procedures also list the first four reasons included in Rule 1114 and add an additional
criterion that the issue involves the constitutionality of a state statute. PA. SUP. CT. INTERNAL
OPERATING PROC. V(A).
89 See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9545(a) (1998) ("Original jurisdiction over a proceeding under this subchapter shall be in the court of common pleas."). See generally PostConviction Relief Act, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 9541-9546 (1998) (providing the sole postconviction means of obtaining collateral relief for those innocent of the crimes for which they
were convicted and those serving illegal sentences); PA. R. CRIM. P. 1500-1510 (enumerating
rules governing the Post-Conviction Relief Act).
90 See Commonwealth v. Wells, 719 A.2d 729, 731 (Pa. 1998) ("Appellant has a right of
appeal if the PCRA court denies his petition."). Cf. Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 720 A.2d 693,
700 (Pa. 1998) ("After we recognized the existence, in this Commonwealth, of a right to effective post-conviction counsel, this court determined that counsel's deficient performance had, in
effect, denied the petitioner the right of appeal guaranteed by Art. V, § 9 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.") (citing Commonwealth v. Albert, 561 A.2d 736, 738 (Pa. 1989)).
91 The exercise of discretion here is the same as that on direct appeal. See supra notes 86,
88. If the defendant is sentenced to death, however, the supreme court hears the post-conviction
appeal instead of the superior court. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9546(d) (1998).
92 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9544(a)(2) (1998); see also Commonwealth v. Banks, 656
A.2d 467, 469 (Pa. 1995) (discussing § 9544(a)(2)). On all but death penalty cases, the highest
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These "previously litigated" claims may not be reheard in postconviction proceedings. 93 For state-law purposes, therefore, a claim
is final after the highest court to hear the case on its merits has ruled
on it. Discretionary review in the supreme court is not necessary
94 for a
claim to be "previously litigated" and thus final in state court.
Thus, Pennsylvania offers defendants the right to twice have his
or her case heard by superior court and to twice petition the supreme
court for allowance to appeal. For state law purposes, individual issues, however, are final after one presentation to superior court and
without having ever been presented to the supreme court. Therefore,
if the Pennsylvania Exhaustion Order is given effect, presenting an
issue once to superior court either on direct appeal or in a postconviction posture will render the issue final for purposes of federal
habeas review. The post-O'Sullivan question is whether federal
courts will ultimately honor the Pennsylvania Exhaustion Order and
other state courts' attempts to reach the same end.
Il.THE INTERESTS OF FEDERAL COURTS, STATE COURTS, AND
PRISONERS

Whether these and other attempts by state supreme courts to remove themselves from the federal habeas exhaustion loop will be
honored in federal court is an open question.95 In answering that
appellate court in which a defendant has a right to appeal is the superior court. See 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (1998); PA. R. APP. P. 1114.
93 See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9543(a)(3) (1998) ('To be eligible for relief under this
subchapter, the petitioner must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence... [t]hat
the allegation of error has not been previously litigated... -);cf. Commonwealth v. Albrecht,
720 A.2d 693, 703 (Pa. 1998) ("The requirement that a claim for PCRA relief not be previously
litigated would be rendered a nullity if this court could be compelled to revisit every issue decided on direct appeal upon the bald assertion that that decision was erroneous.").
94 See Commonwealth v. Bond, 630 A.2d 1281, 1282 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). Bond held
that claims raised in the post-conviction petition had been "discussed thoroughly" by superior
court on direct appeal; "[t]he issues are therefore 'fimally litigated' and not subject to further
review." Id. Implicitly, no supreme court review was necessary for the claims to be "finally
litigated." See also Commonwealth v. Hutchins, 760 A.2d 50, 54-55 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000)
(noting that even though the prisoner did not file a timely petition for allowance to appeal in the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the issues raised on direct appeal to superior court were previously litigated and not open to review in a post-conviction posture).
9 Four members of the O'Sullivan Court (Justice Souter concurring and the three dissenters) noted that the court left this question open. Justice Souter stated:
I understand the Court to have left open the question (not directly implicated
by this case) whether we should construe the exhaustion doctrine to force a State, in
effect, to rule on discretionary review applications when the State has made it plain
that it does not wish to require such applications before its petitioners may seek federal habeas relief.
[Wie leave open the possibility that a state prisoner is likewise free to skip a
procedure even when a state court has occasionally employed it to provide relief, so
long as the State has identified the procedure as outside the standard review process
and has plainly said that it need not be sought for the purpose of exhaustion.
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question, several factors should be considered: whether the language
of the federal habeas statute should be read to allow this exception to
the exhaustion requirement; whether the policies behind the exhaustion requirement--especially the comity interests that underlie the
doctrine-are being furthered or hindered by this rule; and how the
various and sometimes competing interests of federal courts, state
courts, and habeas prisoners balance in relation to each other.
A. The Language and Interpretationof the FederalHabeas Corpus
Statute
The starting point in this analysis, of course, is the language of
the habeas statute. 6 Federal courts, not state courts, control the interpretation and meaning of this statutory language.97 Bold assertions
like that of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, that "the litigant shall be
deemed to have exhausted all available state remedies for purposes of
federal habeas corpus relief,,98 are meaningless if the federal courts
choose to ignore them. Prior to O'Sullivan, the Ninth Circuit did just
this in ignoring the Arizona Supreme Court's first attempt to remove
itself from the exhaustion requirement. 99
The federal habeas statute clearly requires exhaustion of all
available state remedies. °° Application for discretionary review is an
available state remedy. 101 None of the state supreme courts that have
tried to remove themselves from the exhaustion requirement have
made discretionary review unavailable to those presenting federal
constitutional claims that might be presented to a federal habeas
court. 102

O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 849-50 (1999) (Souter, J.,
concurring)). See also iL at
864 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (noting that "the majority has left the matter open" as to whether
Justice Souter's approach should be adopted or even whether a presumption should be created
that supreme court discretionary review is unnecessary unless a state declares that it wishes to
have the opportunity to review claims before presentation to federal court).
96 See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 429-30 (2000) (beginning its analysis by
quoting and examining the language of the federal habeas statute).
9 See, e.g., Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) ("[Tihe
exhaustion doctrine is a matter of federal law ....), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1996 (2000).
98 Pennsylvania Exhaustion Order, supranote 79.
99 See supra Part II.A.
'00 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (1994) ("An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted
the remedies available in the courts of the State... if he has the right under the law of the State
to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.").
'0' See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999).
'02 See State v. Sandon, 777 P.2d 220, 221 (Ariz. 1989) (en bane) (finding that supreme
court review is only mandatory in cases involving death penalty or life imprisonment, otherwise
appeals are exhausted at the intermediate appellate court level); Pennsylvania Exhaustion Order,
supra note 79 (stating that discretionary review is not unavailable but not necessary to exhaust
state remedies); Re Exhaustion of State Remedies in Criminal and Post-Conviction Relief Cases,
471 S.E. 2d 454 (S.C. 1990) (holding that appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court is not
necessary to have exhausted all state remedies).
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If federal courts are unwilling to find that discretionary review in
a supreme court is "unavailable" simply because of the language of
the habeas statute, the resolution of this open question is easy. The
statute requires exhaustion of any remedy that a state prisoner has
"the right... to raise."10 3 As the O'Sullivan Court noted, a prisoner
has the right to raise these issues in the state supreme court regardless
of any right to have the issues actually heard.' 4 Following the strict
language of the habeas statute and the narrow holding of O'Sullivan,
the state supreme court rules have no effect.
The Supreme Court, however, has never strictly read the habeas
statute to require every conceivable, and hence "available," state remedy when these remedies are ineffectual 10 5 or when they frustrate the
ability to ever exhaust state court remedies. 10 6 The Court has repeatedly reiterated this principle in fairly broad terms. 10 7 The O'Sullivan
Court, though holding that discretionary review was an available
remedy that must be pursued, did say that "a discretionary review
08
system does not, without more, make review . . . unavailable."'
This language also seems to indicate a willingness to bend the definition of "available" if something "more!' exists in the state's rules.
In Arizona, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina, the something
"more" is the clear pronouncement that the state supreme courts do
not want the opportunity to review cases before federal courts entertain federal habeas petitions. Because "available" sometimes can
mean that technically available options can be bypassed, the habeas
statute is not dispositive in this situation. 10 9 The proviso in
O'Sullivan that a federal court must honor a state rule making a given
To make the procedure technically unavailable, the Pennsylvania Exhaustion Order, for
example, could have said "we hereby declare that in all appeals from criminal convictions or
post-conviction relief matters, this Court will not review claims that the conviction violated the
United States Constitution." Had the court limited its jurisdiction in this way, a state prisoner
would have exhausted his or her remedies by appealing to superior court not because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court said so, but because "there is an absence of available State corrective
process." 28 U.S.C. §2254(b)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 1998).
'03 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c).
104 See O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845.
'05 See Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 249-50 (1971) (per curiam) (holding that
petitioner exhausted available state remedies despite his failure to pursue alternate remedies to
state habeas).
106 See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 447 (1953) (holding that repetitive petitions containing arguments already decided in state courts are not necessary because the state procedures
otherwise would be non-exhaustible).
107 See, e.g., O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 844 ("Although this language [of §2254(c)] could be
read to effectively foreclose habeas review by requiring a state prisoner to invoke any possible
avenue of state court review, we have never interpreted the exhaustion requirement in such a
restrictive fashion.") (citing Wilwording, 404 U.S. at 249-50).
'c Id. at 848.
109 See Charles F. Baird, The Habeas Corpus Revolution: A New Rolefor State Courts?, 27
ST. MARY's LJ. 297, 299 (1996) ("The scope of the writ of habeas corpus has been defined
more by judicial decision than by statute.") (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81

(1977)).
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procedure unavailable 1 ° mandates a federal court inquiry when a
state has created a rule that proclaims that a procedure is "unavailable."
For example, the Pennsylvania Exhaustion Order says "a litigant
shall not be required to petition for rehearing or allowance of appeal
following an adverse decision by the Superior Court in order to be
deemed to have exhausted all available state remedies respecting a
claim of error."11 ' This is clearly an attempt to make the procedure
not necessary for habeas corpus proceedings. It also still leaves discretionary review available for those who choose to seek it.11 2 The
question facing the federal courts is whether "not necessary" should
be equated with "unavailable."
Assuming that "available" is a flexible enough concept to allow
exhaustion when something "more" exists in state rules, the focus of
the inquiry should then turn to whether the exhaustion doctrine and
the comity interests that underly it are served when a state supreme
court attempts to remove its discretionary review from the exhaustion
requirement. At least four Supreme Court Justices appear willing to
look beyond the strict wording of the habeas statute and instead to
decide the issue based upon the1 policies underlying the exhaustion
doctrine and its comity concerns. 3
B. The Exhaustion Doctrineand Comity
The primary reason for the creation of the exhaustion requirement was concerns over comity, 1 4 which "teaches that one court
"o See O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 847-48.
111 Pennsylvania Exhaustion Order, supra note 79.
1 2 See Blasi v. Attorney Gen., 120 F. Supp. 2d 451, 464-69 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (discussing
that a petitioner may, but need not, seek discretionary review).
113 Concurring in O'Sullivan, Justice Souter commented that
I understand that we leave open the possibility that a state prisoner is likewise free to
skip a procedure even when a state court has occasionally employed it to provide relief, so long as the State has identified the procedure as outside the standard review
process and has plainly said that it need not be sought for the purpose of exhaustion.
It is not obvious that either comity or precedent requires otherwise.
O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 850 (Souter, J., concurring). In a dissent joined by Justices Ginsburg
and Breyer, Justice Stevens stated: "I agree with Justice Souter... that a proper conception of
comity obviously requires deference to such a policy [i.e., that states 'do not wish the opportunity to review such claims before they pass into the federal system']." Id. at 861-62 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted). In a dissent joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, Justice
Breyer stated:
In my view, whether a state prisoner (who failed to seek discretionary review in a
state supreme court) can seek federal habeas relief depends upon the State's own
preference. If the State does not want the prisoner to seek discretionary state review
(or if it does not care), why should that failure matter to federal habeas law?
Id. at 862 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
114 See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991) ("[The] exhaustion requirement
is also grounded in principles of comity .... "); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515 (1982)
("[Clomity was the basis for the exhaustion doctrine .... "); see also LARRY W. YACKLE,
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should defer action on causes properly within its jurisdiction until the
courts of another sovereignty with concurrent powers, and already
cognizant of the litigation, have had an opportunity to pass upon the
matter." 5 Comity avoids the "unseemly" result of having a federal
court overturn a state conviction without first giving the state the opportunity to correct a constitutional violation,' 6 and this, in turn, "reduces the 'inevitable friction"'7 that results from the federal court
overturning a state conviction!"
8
Comity also entails a "proper respect for state functions.""
This is embodied by a federal court respecting state procedural
POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES 236 (1981) ("The judicially-developed exhaustion doctrine is
founded on the notion of 'comity' ....").
The related concept of federalism is also sometimes discussed in habeas cases. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420,436-37 (2000) (holding that the purpose of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 "[is] to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism"); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 726 ("This is a case about federalism."). Comity as part of the
exhaustion doctrine, however, "'express[es] federalism by deference to the sovereign interest of
a state."' Norlynn Blocker, Comment, An Exercise in Comity: Exhaustionof State Remedies in
FederalHabeas Corpus Proceedings,35 BAYLOR L. REv. 497, 506 (1983) (alteration in original) (quoting Felder v. Estelle, 693 F.2d 549, 554 (5th Cir. 1982)). Because of the interconnectedness and even interchangeability of these two concepts, this Article concentrates on the comity aspects of the exhaustion doctrine.
n5 Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950), overruled in part by Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391 (1963); see also supra note 12 (discussing the O'Sullivan Court's summary of its comity
jurisprudence). Comity originally was a concept developed for international law and imported
into habeas law in the nineteenth century. See YACKLE, supranote 114, at 236. In the international setting, comity suggests that the law of one sovereign nation should be given force within
the dominion of another. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895) (stating that comity
is one nation's recognition, within its own borders, of another nation's laws for the purpose of
resolving international disputes).
This concept, however, does not entirely fit within a federal system. Because of the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, cl. 2, "federal law
operates of its own force upon and within the states and does not depend upon the willingness of
state authorities to accept it." YACKLE, supra note 114, at 236. Instead, comity in habeas cases
represents "a view that the federal government should respect state proceedings in the same way
that one nation would respect the judicial proceedings of another." Note, The FederalInterest
Approach to State Waiver of the Exhaustion Requirement in FederalHabeas Corpus, 97 HARv.
L REV. 511,513 (1983) (footnote omitted).
Consequently, as a policy decision to ease the workings of the federal system, the federal
judiciary agreed to withhold its power to hear habeas cases until the states had been given an
opportunity first to rule on the constitutional claims. See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275
(1971) ("The exhaustion-of-state-remedies doctrine ...reflects a policy of federal-state comity,
'an accommodation of our federal system designed to give the State the initial "opportunity to
pass upon and correct" alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights."') (footnote and citations omitted) (quoting Vilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 250 (1971)). The Supreme
Court first articulated the term "comity" in a habeas case in Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241,252
(1886). See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 80 (1977).
16 See Darr,339 U.S. at 204.
17 Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (quoting Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S.
539,550 (1981)).
18 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,44 (1971). Younger was not a habeas case, but instead
concerned whether a federal court could restrain a state from continuing with an ongoing criminal prosecution. See id. at 40-41. The Younger Court based its decision largely on grounds of
comity and federalism, however. See id. at 43-54 (discussing that principles of comity and
federalism form the basis of the historic public policy against federal court intervention in state
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rules. 119 Further, comity advises the courts of one jurisdiction to give
effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another,
not as a matter of
120
obligation, but out of deference and respect.
Thus, as a general statement, comity requires a state prisoner
first to present his or her claims to state court before a federal court
can consider the issue. In O'Sullivan, the Court, relying largely upon
the doctrine of comity, determined that exhausting the claim in state
court included a trip through the state supreme court. 121 The postO'Sullivan questions, though, are whether comity still requires presentation of issues to the state supreme court when that court has affirmatively stated that it does not want to be included in the exhaustion requirement and whether comity suggests that a federal court
must honor the state's rule that
122 discretionary review is unnecessary to
exhaust the state's remedies.
If the comity doctrine is intended to protect a state from "unseemly" intervention that will cause friction between the federal and
state systems, its principles are not served when a state supreme court
does not care if a federal court intervenes without it first being given
the opportunity to rule on the claims. A state could not be heard to
complain that one of its prisoners did not file for discretionary review
in the state supreme court when the state explicitly has said that it did
not want this opportunity to review the claim. 123 No friction can result in this situation. 24
court proceedings); cf Lawrence S. Hirsh, Note, State Waiver of the Exhaustion Requirement in
Habeas Corpus Cases, 52 GEO. WSH. L. REv. 419, 425-27 (1984) (discussing how the
Younger definition of comity has been used in habeas cases). Even though Younger was not a
habeas case, it has been cited with favor in habeas cases. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501
U.S. 722, 746 (1991); Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484,491 (1973).
"9 See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 726 ("[This case] concerns the respect that federal courts owe
the States and the States' procedural rules when reviewing the claims of state prisoners in federal habeas corpus."); cf Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000) ("In keeping this delicate balance [between the states and federal courts], we have been careful... to safeguard the
States' interest in the integrity of their criminal and collateral proceedings.").
120 See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982).
121 See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845-46 (1999). The Court required "one full
opportunity" for the state to review the conviction, which includes presenting any claim to be
raised in federal court first to the state supreme court. See id. at 845.
122 Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens agreed that the Court left this question
open. See supranote 95.
12 Cf. Ohio Bureau of Employment Serv. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 480 (1977) ("If the
State voluntarily chooses to submit to a federal forum, principles of comity do not demand that
the federal court force the case back into the State's own system.").
124 The solution suggested by Justice Breyer's O'Sullivan dissent-that state supreme court
review is unnecessary for exhaustion purposes unless the state has affirmatively indicated that it
wanted the opportunity to review the claims-falls short on this count. See O'Sullivan, 526
U.S. at 862-64 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Comity still requires that the state supreme court be
given an opportunity to pass on the claim before a prisoner can turn to federal court unless the
court has made an affirmative statement that discretionary review is unnecessary. That a supreme court exercises its discretion infrequently does not mean that it is insensitive to federal
court intervention when it may have corrected the problem if it had been presented with it first.
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Not only is comity not furthered in this situation, its principles
may actually be hindered. The O'Sullivan majority implicitly recognized this. The Court said that "[the petitioner] may be correct that
the increased, unwelcome burden on state supreme courts disserves
The
the comity interests underlying the exhaustion doctrine."'
Court then allowed that a state rule making a remedy unavailable
must be honored by a federal court.'2 In other words, the states may
relieve this "unwelcome burden" by creating a rule that a particular
procedure is "unavailable."28127 In this situation, comity would suggest
that the rule be followed.
If comity, then, is understood to mean that federal courts should
respect a state court's rule that it is satisfied with its opportunity to
review a conviction without discretionary review, federal courts
should respect that state court's wish to be removed from the exhaustion requirement. Also, comity is not frustrated when a state declares
that it does not care if a federal court intervenes without discretionary
supreme court review.
C. Full and FairOpportunityfor a State to Considera Fairly
PresentedClaim
The O'Sullivan Court noted that the habeas statute and the exhaustion doctrine require the prisoner to give the state courts a "full
and fair opportunity to resolve federal constitutional claims before
those claims are presented to the federal courts."' 29 The Court then
determined that "state prisoners must give the state courts one full
opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one com' 30
plete round of the State's established appellate review process.' ,
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that claims must be "fairly
presented" to state courts and that states must be given a full and fair
opportunity to31resolve the issue before the prisoner can resort to a
federal court.
See id. at 845-46 (arguing that "comity interests that drive the exhaustion doctrine" are served
by giving the state courts "one complete round" of established review, which includes discretionary supreme court review).
12 Id. at 847. In an earlier case, Justice Blackmun similarly wondered whether comity was
served by forcing state court review of meritless claims solely for the sake of exhaustion. In his
concurrence in Rose v. Landy, Justice Blackmun said this policy "appears more destructive than
solicitous of federal-state comity." Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 525 (1982) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
1"6 See O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 847-48.
127 Whether a particular rule makes the procedure "unavailable" within the meaning of the
habeas statute also must be addressed by the federal court. See supraPart IRLA.
128 See O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 847-48.
129 Id. at 845.
130 Id.
131 See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971) ("[O]nce the federal claim has been
fairly presented to the state courts, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied."); see also Duncan v.
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The reason for this requirement is that it gives the state the first
opportunity to rule on the issue. 132 This furthers the exhaustion doctrine and its comity concerns. 133 Once the state courts have had a full
and fair opportunity to consider a fairly presented claim, the claim is
exhausted and comity is not offended by federal court review.
The O'Sullivan Court held that the exhaustion doctrine required
discretionary review through the state supreme court for a full and fair
opportunity to resolve the claims. 134 When a state supreme court tries
to remove itself from the exhaustion requirement, however, the question becomes whether discretionary review is still necessary for the
state to be given a full and fair opportunity to review the claim. 35
If a state supreme court has explicitly attempted to excuse itself
from the exhaustion requirement, the federal court should ask whether
the existing state procedures without discretionary review can be
deemed to be a "full and fair opportunity" for the state to review the
claims. If the state supreme court believes that discretionary review
is not necessary, that court must believe that the state's courts have
had a full and fair opportunity to rule on the claim. Further evidence
of whether the state has had a full and fair opportunity would be provided if the state's own procedures define an issue to be finally litigated without discretionary review by the supreme court. 136 If the
state has taken these two steps, it has, in effect, "identified the procedure as outside the standard review process."'137 This should lead to
the conclusion that the state has had a full and fair opportunity to review the claims.
The next question is whether submitting a claim only to the intermediate appellate court "fairly presents" the claim to the state

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (per curiam) ("[E]xhaustiot of state remedies requires that
petitioners 'fairly presen[tl' federal claims to the state courts in order to give the State the 'opportunity to pass upon and correct" alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights."') (second
alteration in original) (some internal quotation marks omitted in original) (citing Picard,404
U.S. at 275); Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982) (per curiam) ("ITihe habeas petitioner
must have 'fairly presented' to the state courts the 'substance' of his federal habeas corpus
claim.') (citations omitted); cf. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 10 (1992) ("Just as the
State must afford the petitioner a full and fair hearing on his federal claim, so must the petitioner
afford the State a full and fair opportunity to address and resolve the claim on the merits.")
(citing Picard, 404 U.S. at 275); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989) (holding that
presenting an issue for the first and only time in state supreme court discretionary review is not
"fair presentation").
132 See Picard,404 U.S. at 275 (noting that the exhaustion doctrine requires that the state
should have the initial opportunity to rule upon the issues).
33 See id. (noting that this "reflects a policy of federal-state comity").
34 See O'Sullivan,526 U.S. at 845-46.
135 Several members of the Court agreed that O'Sullivan left this question open. See supra
note 95.
36 See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
1 O'Sullivan,526 U.S. at 850 (Souter, J., concurring); see also id. at 845 (requiring that a
prisoner "invokfe] one complete round of the State's established appellate review process").
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courts. 38 The Supreme Court has said that offering a claim for the
first and only time in a petition for discretionary review with the state
supreme court is not a fair presentation. 139 This is because the claim
will be considered on its merits only when, in that case, "there are
special and important reasons therefor.' 14° When a state intermediate
appellate court has considered a claim on its merits in an appeal and
when the state supreme court has indicated that discretionary review
is not necessary, presenting the claim only to the intermediate appellate court should be sufficient for the claim to be "fairly presented" to
the state court.
If the state supreme court has not affirmatively stated that its review is unnecessary for exhaustion purposes or if the state's procedures otherwise require discretionary review before a claim is considered to be final, the state has not had a full and fair opportunity to review the claim without discretionary review. In this situation, nothing has removed discretionary review from the state's standard review
process and discretionary review still is part of the "one complete
round of the141State's established appellate review process" required by
O'Sullivan.
D. A State Supreme Court's Role as the Supervisor of the
Development of Federal ConstitutionalLaw Within the State
Allowing state supreme courts to remove themselves from the
exhaustion requirement could have the effect of removing supreme
courts from their role to supervise the development of law within their
states.'
If every prisoner on appeal chose to bypass the state supreme court and to proceed directly to federal court, this could be a
potential concern.
Not every prisoner, however, will choose this route. Most prisoners with a strong or novel constitutional claim will not bypass an
opportunity for relief in the state supreme court, 4 3 especially when

138If a claim has been "fairly presented" to the state courts, the exhaustion requirement has

been satisfied. See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971).

139See Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1988).
'4
Id. (quoting PA. R. APP.P. 1114).
.1 O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845.
141 See Laura S. Schnell, Comment, State Waiver and Forfeiture of the Exhaustion Requirement in Habeas Corpus Actions, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 354, 365 (1983) ("[The exhaustion
requirement allows state high courts to supervise their lower courts and create a coherent body
of state law and state interpretation of constitutional law.").
1 See R. Stephen Painter, Jr., Note, O'Sullivan v. Boerckel and the Default of State Prisoners' FederalClaims: Comity or Tragedy?,78 N.C. L. Rv.1604, 1635 (2000) (explaining the
reasons that a prisoner would pursue relief in state supreme court); see also Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 103 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("In the ordinary case, litigants simply
hav4 no incentive to slight the state tribunal, since constitutional adjudication of the state and
federal levels are not mutually exclusive."). Peter Sessions has argued:
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that relief would be delivered more quickly than by a trip through
federal court, and when relief is granted more often on direct review
rather than in a habeas proceeding.144 Furthermore, with the federal
courts erecting procedural bars to relief in state courts, the state court
has become the best hope for relief for a state prisoner. 45 Prisoners
with garden-variety constitutional claims may choose not to present
those claims to the supreme court. The46supreme court, though, would
accept few of these cases in any event.1
Furthermore, a federal habeas court is not permitted to create a
new rule of constitutional law. 147 If a prisoner is seeking to change a
principle of constitutional law, he or she must pursue that claim in
state courts or in the United States Supreme Court on direct review
from a state court judgment. Moreover, a novel claim like this is precisely the kind of claim on which a state supreme court would be
more likely to grant review. Prisoners in this position will thus continue to seek review in the state supreme courts.
Prisoners who have a realistic chance of being granted discretionary review will likely file with the state supreme court and therefore that court will continue to supervise the development of federal

[D]efendants and their attorneys know full well that objections made at trial
and on direct appeal are far more likely to succeed than those made in a federal habeas corpus petition. The sandbag theory not only presupposes that defendants and
their attorneys willingly adopt extremely risky legal strategies when less risky alternatives are available, but it also presupposes that defendants are willing to spend
several years in prison to test those strategies. These assumptions simply are not
tenable.
Peter Sessions, Swift Justice?:Imposing a Statute of Limitations on the FederalHabeas Corpus
Petitionsof State Prisoners,70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1513, 1546 (1997) (footnote omitted).
144 See Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 837, 894 (1984) (discussing the infrequency with which relief is granted in federal habeas proceedings).
"4 See Baird, supra note 109, at 338 (discussing the limitations placed on federal judges
when dealing with state prisoners).
146 Supreme courts with discretionary review typically accept cases with broad application
or novel issues, not garden-variety constitutional claims. See infra note 157 and accompanying
text; see also ROBERT L. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES § 6.7(c), at 156-

59 (2d ed. 1989) (collecting standards of review for granting discretionary review from various
states' highest courts).
147 The relevant portion of the habeas statute reads:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant
to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that
was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of
the claim ... resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States ....
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (Supp. IV 1998); see also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310, (1989)
(stating that new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be announced or applied on
collateral review); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 380 (2000) (noting that § 2254(d)(1) codifies the rule of Teague v. Lane).
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constitutional law in virtually the same manner as now.148 Allowing a
prisoner to skip supreme court discretionary review-especially when
most of those prisoners skipping will have virtually no chance of being granted review-will have little, if any, impact on a state's development of federal constitutional issues.
E. Finalityof the Conviction or QuickerRelieffor the Prisoner
Both the state and the prisoner have an interest in a quicker ultimate resolution of the case.' 49 The state has an interest in securing
the finality of its judgments. 50 This is expressed in both the desire to
reach a final judgment that, absent extraordinary considerations, is no
longer open to further review15 1 and one that is reached expeditiously. 152 On the other hand,
53 prisoners have an interest in receiving
relief as quickly as possible.
Rather than being undercut, the principle of finality is advanced
by skipping discretionary review by the state supreme court. A run
through the state's direct appeal process, its post-conviction procedures, and federal habeas review will be completed months and conceivably years sooner without one, or more probably two, mandatory
148

Cf. supra note 75 and accompanying text (noting that the Arizona Supreme Court ac-

cepts discretionary review on some cases even though it is of the opinion that state remedies are
exhausted after consideration by the intermediate appellate court).
149 See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467,491 (1991) ("Neither innocence nor just punishment can be vindicated until the final judgement is known."); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S.
1, 24-25 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ('Both the individual criminal defendant and society
have an interest in insuring that there will at some point be the certainty that comes with an end
to litigation, and that attention will ultimately be focused... on whether the prisoner can be
restored to a useful place in the community.").
'5o See generallyCalderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538,555-56 (1998) (detailing the state's
interests in the finality of a judgment). But cf. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 373 (1993)
("A federal habeas petitioner has no interest in the finality of the state-court judgment under
which he is incarcerated: Indeed, the very purpose of his habeas petition is to overturn that
judgment.").
1
See McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 490-96 (requiring that, because of the importance of finality, a claim must be properly presented-that is, not procedurally defaulted-in state court to be
considered in a federal habeas petition; if it has been defaulted, the federal court may only entertain a habeas petition in "extraordinary instances when a constitutional violation probably has
caused the conviction of one innocent of the crime").
1-2 Cf. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 863 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing
that requiring unwanted discretionary review in state supreme courts "will add to the burdens of
already over-burdened state courts and delay further a criminal process that is often criticized
for too much delay"); Hobo v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 264-65 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (complaining about "interminable delays in the execution of state and federal criminal
sentences ... produced by various aspects of [the Supreme] Court's habeas corpus jurisprudence"). If speeding claims to and through federal court were the sole federal concern, however, the best way to achieve this would be to eliminate the exhaustion requirement altogether.
See Schnell, supranote 142, at 369.
153 See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520 (1982) ('The prisoner's principal interest, of
course, is in obtaining speedy federal relief on his claims."); Sessions, supra note 143, at 154647 ("Petitioners almost always want a speedy resolution to their claims; in some cases it may
mean freedom from their incarceration.") (footnote omitted).
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filings in the state supreme court. Also, a prisoner's capacity to file
multiple habeas corpus petitions is unaffected by a state not requiring
him or her to file a petition for discretionary review.
Another finality-related concern is that a retrial may become difficult or impossible if a federal court grants relief in the distant future
because memories fade, witnesses disappear, and evidence is lost or
destroyed. 54 Because federal habeas relief would be granted sooner
without the added delay of discretionary review in the state supreme
court, the effects of this problem are lessened.
A final finality-related consideration is that the writ of habeas
corpus, by its very nature, upsets an otherwise final state court judgment.1 55 Habeas law has developed to minimize this federal intervention and to allow it only when a state court first has had an opportunity to review a conviction.156 When a state has defined its own procedures to declare a judgment final without supreme court review,
and its supreme court has said that it does not want the opportunity to
review a conviction before review in federal court, finality concerns
are not implicated by federal review. In this situation, a federal court
issuing the writ of habeas corpus is no more intrusive than if it issues
the writ after discretionary review has been sought and denied.
F. Effective Appellate Advocacy in a Petitionfor Discretionary
Review
Aside from the preceding considerations, requiring petitioners to
raise all issues in the state supreme court does not reflect the way appellate law is or should be practiced. When the intermediate appellate
court denies relief, the defendant must determine which issues are
likely to catch the supreme court's attention. A court with discretionary jurisdiction is going to accept claims that have broader impact and
that are not highly fact-sensitive. A defendant who is the victim of a
bad opinion from the intermediate court on a garden-variety issue is

'54 See McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 491 ("[W]hen a habeas petitioner succeeds in obtaining a
new trial, the erosion of memory and dispersion of witnesses that occur with the passage of time
prejudice the government and diminish the chances of a reliable criminal adjudication.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
15 See Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 7 (1992) ("The writ strikes at finality of a
state criminal conviction, a matter of particular importance in a federal system."); McCleskey,
499 U.S. at 491 ('To begin with, the writ strikes at finality.").
156 See Painter, supra note 143, at 1624. Painter argues:
The case law on exhaustion, then, reveals a doctrine of deference on the part of the
federal district courts intended to serve federalism and comity interests. By deferring to state proceedings, the federal courts give the state courts the first chance to
enforce federal law. The exhaustion requirement also prevents a single federal judge
from interfering with the normal course of review of state criminal judgments.
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unlikely to find solace in the supreme court. 157 More fundamentally,
the issues decided by the intermediate court dictate how issues should
be presented to the supreme court.
A recent Third Circuit habeas case, Lines v. Larkins,158 demonstrates how this type of effective advocacy in state court can prove
disastrous for a defendant trying to preserve issues for federal court.

Lines raised several issues in Pennsylvania Superior Court. 159 Because he was a fugitive while his post-trial motions were pending,
superior court held that "appellant has forever forfeited his right to

appeal by electing to become a fugitive after post-trial procedures
have begun."'16 In the petition for allowance to appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Lines challenged the application of this fugitive-forfeiture rule by the superior court but did not present the
court with any of the substantive issues that had not been decided by
the superior court.16 The supreme court denied this petition.' 62 Be-

cause these claims had never been presented to the supreme court,
they were not exhausted in state court. 63 By the time the claims were

raised in federal court, they were procedurally barred in state court.' 64
the Third Circuit dismissed the habeas petition with
Consequently,
1 65

prejudice.

The Pennsylvania case overturning the per se fugitive-forfeiture
rule illustrates why Lines correctly petitioned for allowance to appeal

on only that issue. In Commonwealth v. Huff'6 6 Huff seemingly petitioned the supreme court for review on only the fugitive-forfeiture
rule.167 The court determined that post-trial flight by a defendant

15 See, e.g., PA. R. APP.P. 1114; see also supra notes 86, 88 (setting out the Rule 1114
criteria); cf. infra note 170 (discussing the portion of Justice Stevens's dissent in O'Sullivan
discussing the hallmarks of effective advocacy on petitions for discretionary review).
"s 208 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2000), cert.denied, 121 S.Ct. 785 (2001).
159 See id. at 155-56, 160.
160Id. at 156 (quoting Commonwealth v. Lines, 609 A.2d 832, 834 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)).
161 See id. at 157, 161. The Third Circuit noted that Lines could have included his claims
in his petition for allowance to appeal even though he really wanted the supreme court to review
the fugitive-forfeiture holding of the superior court and not these issues. See id. at 167, 167
n.21. Because Lines was seeking review of the superior court holding and could not seek review of claims not addressed by the superior court, the Third Circuit said that appellate counsel
was not ineffective for failing to list those claims in his petition for allowance to appeal. See id.
at 166-67. Thus, the Third Circuit said that Lines could have but should not have included these
issues in his petition.
162 See id. at 157.
'6 See id. at 162.
164 See id. at 165-66.
165 See id.
at 169.
166 658 A.2d 1340 (Pa. 1995).
167 See id. at 1341 n.1, 1342. The supreme court said that it would not consider other
claims that Huff tried to argue in the supreme court because they were not presented in his petition for allowance to appeal. Instead, the supreme court remanded to superior court for consideration of the issues it did not consider because of its application of the fugitive-forfeiture rule.
See iL; see also G. RONALD DARLINGTON ET AL., PENNSYLVANIA APPELLATE PRACTIcE §
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168
should no longer provide a per se bar to consideration of all issues,
as happened to Lines. By raising only this issue before the supreme
court in the petition for allowance to appeal, Huff risked not exhausting his remedies in state court. Rather than filing a petition
laden with issues the supreme court could not and would not consider
because the superior court had not considered them, Huff's more succinct petition caught the supreme court's attention and changed existing Pennsylvania law. As a result, his issues were considered on
their merits. If Huff had included all of his issues in his petition for
allowance to appeal, the issues may have been presented to the supreme court, but the cumbersome petition may have been lost169in the
multitude of petitions presented to the supreme court each year.
The exhaustion rules from Arizona, Pennsylvania, and South
Carolina allow prisoners petitioning those states' supreme courts for
discretionary review to present only those issues to the supreme court
that have a realistic chance of being accepted.1 70 This will increase
the chance of being granted relief in state court for petitions filed in
the state supreme court and, when this happens, fewer federal habeas
petitions will be filed. It also saves the state supreme courts the burden of wading through multitudes of extra claims each year that have
no realistic chance of being accepted by the court but that are filed
only to fully exhaust state court remedies.' 71 Thus, this rule has the
added benefit of potentially reducing the caseload of both federal and

1115:2 (2d ed. 1999) ("The Supreme Court will refuse to consider issues raised in appellant's
brief that were not contained in appellant's petition for allowance of appeal.").
'6' See Huff, 658 A.2d at 1342 ("In short, appellant's flight from justice prior to sentencing
had no significant effect on the appellate process.").
169 Cf Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("It must prejudice the occasional meritorious application to be buried in a flood of worthless ones. He who
must search a haystack for a needle is likely to end up with the attitude that the needle is not
worth the search.").
170 An O'Sullivan dissent pointed this out. Justice Stevens said that the "'process of "winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on" those more likely to prevail.., is the
hallmark of effective appellate advocacy."' O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 858 (1999)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citations omitted). Justice Stevens continued
that this skill is even more necessary when seeking discretionary review because effective petitions contain only one or two issues and explain why the questions presented have sweeping
importance or why they have divided or confused other courts. See id. Realistically, a defendant cannot file this kind of petition on every issue raised in the court below. See id.
17' See State v. Sandon, 777 P.2d 220, 220 (Ariz. 1989) (en banc) (implying that
the Arizona Supreme Court lacks the resources to consider "large numbers of prisoner petitions seeking
to exhaust state remedies"); Pennsylvania Exhaustion Order, supra note 79 (recognizing that
prisoners routinely petition the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for allowance to appeal to exhaust
state court remedies for federal habeas purposes); cf supra note 54 (addressing the Ninth Circuit's recognition in Jennison v. Goldsmith, 940 F.2d 1308, 1311 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam),
that allowing prisoners to skip discretionary review in the Arizona Supreme Court would lighten
the caseload of the Arizona Supreme Court, which already had limited resources and could not
have considered petitions of all those prisoners filing merely to preserve their federal habeas
rights).
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state courts. 72 At a minimum, it will make the appellate process
more manageable and more rational for attorneys and state prisoners
trying to write effective petitions for discretionary review in state
court and trying to determine whether they should even file these petitions when they have garden-variety claims.173
G. GuardingAgainst State Courts Taking a Milefrom This Inch
Allowing states by their own edict to remove themselves from
the exhaustion requirement could lead some states to abuse this newfound autonomy, and this fear could cause the federal courts to rule
that supreme courts cannot remove themselves from the exhaustion
requirement. To reduce its appellate caseload, a state could create a
rule that its courts should be excluded from the exhaustion requirement altogether. In other words, the state courts would entertain appeals, but, in the state's view, the appeal would not be a necessary
prerequisite for federal habeas review. Or, more likely, a state could
declare that post-conviction relief, while available, need not be sought
prior to the initiation of a federal habeas petition. With state courts
often giving short shrift to post-conviction petitions and with prisoners aware of this, prisoners may be tempted to skip the process altogether and file in federal court at the completion of a direct appeal.
This would cause a dramatic reduction in the state court postconviction and appellate caseloads.
Such a result, however, would undermine many of the purposes
for requiring claims to be first litigated in state court. Initial state
court review allows states to correct errors,174 which means a federal
habeas petition will never be filed and the federal court, thus, will not
become involved in the state court conviction. Initial state court review provides for development of a complete factual record before
the case is considered in federal court. 75 Eliminating state court review in general will increase the federal court caseload. 76 Allowing

'n
Cf. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that
the total exhaustion rule "tends to increase, rather than to alleviate, the caseload burdens on both
state and federal courts").
173See William E. Hellerstein, Filling in Some Pieces: The Supreme Court's CriminalLaw
Decisions in the 1998-1999 Term, 16 TouRo L. REv. 305, 331 (2000) ("The more interesting
question is whether the majority's opinion [in O'Sullivan] really serves the interests of comity
and whether it has the unwelcome consequence of adding unnecessary complexity to the criminal appellate process, the shoals of which defense counsel must navigate.").
'q See O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845 (stating that a state court's right of first review allows
the state a chance to correct its own federal constitutional violations).
175See Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346,349 (1989); Rose, 455 U.S. at 519.
176 See Note, supra note 115, at 523 ("Absent the exhaustion requirement, the federal
courts could be called upon to serve as the primary vindicators of federal constitutional rights in
all state criminal prosecutions. Were the federal courts to assume such a responsibility, the
effect on the federal caseload could be catastrophic.") (footnotes omitted).
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many defendants to skip state court review would hinder 1the
77 development of the state court body of federal constitutional law.
An approach balancing the federal and state interests in exhaustion would prevent this situation. Federal habeas law should allow
states to remove discretionary procedures from the habeas requirement, but still require a prisoner to exhaust all non-discretionary avenues of relief that are part of the "standard review process.' 7 That
would mean that a direct appeal must be pursued as far as a defendant
can proceed as of right under state law. Likewise, a prisoner also
must seek any post-conviction remedies as far as he or she can go as
of right. Furthermore, federal law should reflect state law determinations of when a prisoner has completed his state remedies as of
right. 179 In other words, the exhaustion requirement would apply to
any standard state remedy in which a claim must be reviewed as of
right and would exclude truly discretionary procedures that the state
specifically has announced are not required for the exhaustion of state
remedies.
This accommodation will protect federal court interests while
allowing states some degree of docket control and resource allocation.
It balances comity principles with federal court concerns without allowing the states to go too far.
IV. WEIGHING THE INTERESTS
In O'Sullivan, the Supreme Court simultaneously required discretionary state supreme court review of all claims before they can be
considered in federal court and opened the door for state supreme
courts explicitly to remove themselves from the exhaustion requirement. If a state has not made an explicit rule that discretionary review is unnecessary to exhaust state remedies, then O'Sullivan clearly
requires that the request for discretionary review must be filed with
the state supreme court. Several members of the O'Sullivan Court,
however, also noted that the Court left open the possibility that a state
could remove discretionary supreme court review from the exhaustion
requirement in that state. A few states have walked through this open
door with explicit statements that the state's remedies are exhausted
'7

See Rose, 455 U.S. at 519 ("As the number of prisoners who exhaust all of their federal

claims increases, state courts may become increasingly familiar with and hospitable toward
federal constitutional issues."). Making direct and collateral review optional would reduce the
number of state court appeals raising federal constitutional issues. Unlike the situation discussed above that noted that removing the requirement for a state prisoner to seek state supreme
court discretionary review would have little if any impact on a state's development of its body
of constitutional law, see supra Part IU.D, this policy would eliminate the state altogether from
reviewing federal constitutional claims in many cases.
178 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
179 See, e.g., supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text (detailing Pennsylvania's determination of when a claim is final for state law purposes).
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without a prisoner filing for discretionary review in the state supreme
court. States should be permitted to make this choice.
Because the Supreme Court has held that not every "available"
remedy must be pursued to exhaust state remedies, the existence of a
technically available remedy in state supreme court discretionary review should not end the analysis. The O'Sullivan Court added that a
discretionary review system "without more" does not render a remedy
unavailable. When a state has added "more," however, the federal
court must honor its rule. A state supreme court's explicit declaration
that a petition for discretionary review is unnecessary to exhaust state
remedies should be sufficiently "more" to advance the analysis beyond the strict wording of the statute and to ask whether allowing
such a procedure furthers the various principles of federal habeas law.
The key principle is whether the comity concerns underlying the
exhaustion doctrine are promoted by allowing a state supreme court
to remove itself from the exhaustion requirement. The O'Sullivan
Court allowed that forcing a state to consider unwanted petitions for
discretionary review might disserve the comity interests of the exhaustion doctrine. Furthermore, comity dictates that federal courts
honor and give effect to state rules. If a state's own procedures define
an issue as being final for state law purposes without discretionary
review, and if the state has created an explicit rule that supreme court
discretionary review is unnecessary for habeas purposes, federal
courts should honor the state's rules.
Comity is also designed to reduce friction between the federal
and state systems created when a federal court intervenes in a state
conviction before a state court has had the opportunity to first rule on
the allegations of error. If a state is satisfied that its procedures without discretionary review have allowed for adequate review of an issue, no additional friction can result from federal review. Contrarily,
forcing a state supreme court to entertain unwanted petitions that have
virtually no chance of success and that clog an already crowded
docket disserves rather than promotes comity principles.
To properly exhaust state remedies, a prisoner, should still have
to raise the issue as far as he or she can pursue the claim as of right
through the state's "established appellate review process" and its
post-conviction procedures. If a state supreme court seeks to remove
itself from the exhaustion requirement, the state must believe that review through the lower appellate court is adequate. In other words,
the state has had a "full and fair opportunity" to review the claim
without presentation to the supreme court. If a state believes it has
been provided with a full and fair opportunity to review the claim,
comity should dictate that the federal court honor this belief.
Allowing a state supreme court to remove itself from the exhaustion requirement will benefit the state without causing any detri-
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mental effects to the state court system. From the state supreme
court's perspective, the primary benefit, of course, is a reduced number of filings for discretionary review on garden-variety issues. A
secondary benefit is that petitions for discretionary review can be
better crafted to include only the issues likely to attract the court's
attention without including less meritorious issues merely to preserve
them for eventual federal habeas review.
In addition, removing discretionary review from the habeas requirement should not have much, if any, impact upon the body of
state constitutional law. Prisoners with a strong or novel constitutional issue have two reasons to continue to petition the state supreme
court for review even if they are not required to take this step. First,
such a petition provides another opportunity for relief, which will be
provided more quickly than relief for some future speculative federal
court action. Second, novel constitutional claims cannot be decided
by a federal habeas court. In other words, the body of law being decided by the supreme court should not be affected because selfselection by prisoners about which issues to file in the supreme court
will probably closely resemble the cases accepted for review if all
cases were presented for discretionary review. Furthermore, requiring review as far as the prisoner can go as of right still ensures that
the lower appellate court in the state will continue to develop case law
on federal constitutional law.
The prisoner also receives benefits with little, if any, negative
consequences from not having to file for discretionary supreme court
review. By not having to wait months for the supreme court to rule
on the petition for discretionary review, the prisoner will be able to
seek federal relief sooner. He or she also will be able to better present
claims to the state supreme court in petitions for discretionary review,
and this increases the chances that the court will take the case. Without this added level of technical pleading, the prisoner also is less
likely to procedurally default a claim.
For a prisoner, the only possible disadvantage is that he or she is
foregoing a potential opportunity for relief by skipping the state supreme court. If the prisoner has a strong or novel constitutional
claim, he or she probably will not forego this opportunity for relief.
A garden-variety issue not presented to a state supreme court, though,
likely would not have been given review by the high court; a prisoner
in this situation is in no worse of a position by not filing for discretionary review.
Allowing federal court review without a prisoner first presenting
the claim to the state supreme court does little to alter the federal
court interests in exhaustion. A state supreme court's per curiam order declining to hear the case does not create a further record in state
court. Skipping discretionary review in the state supreme court al-
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lows for quicker resolution of the case and promotes finality of the
state court judgment. Federal court caseloads will remain virtually
the same. A prisoner determined to file a habeas petition will not be
more or less likely to file a habeas petition depending on whether he
or she first had to request review in the state supreme court. Because
state supreme courts hear so few cases on discretionary appeal and the
prisoners do not always receive relief in those cases the courts do
take, the impact on the federal court docket would be minimal. Furthermore, the ability to craft better petitions for discretionary review
may cause the supreme courts to grant more of these petitions, which
would offset any feared increase in federal court habeas filings.
The only potential "detriment" to the federal court would be that
fewer prisoners would be likely to procedurally default because one
less hurdle-and one fraught with potential for a prisoner to default a
claim' 8° -would be erected for them to jump through in state court.
This, however, cannot be a justification for requiring unwanted discretionary review in the state supreme court. First, the federal courts,
as a policy matter, cannot be hoping to "create... procedural hurdle[s] on the path to federal habeas court." 181 Second, creating a system with increased procedural default does not reduce federal court
caseload, but merely redirects the habeas court from a decision on the
182
merits to a determination about the procedural aspect of the case.
In either event, the federal court still must dispose of the habeas petition.
CONCLUSION

Allowing state supreme courts to remove themselves from the
exhaustion requirement would open a dialogue between the federal
and state courts. Rather than a federal court, in parental fashion, telling the state when it has provided enough review of state convictions,
the states would have some input in defining what constitutes a "full
and fair opportunity" for the state to review claims before federal
court review. If a state explicitly says that it wants to remove discre18 See supra notes 158-165 and accompanying text (discussing how a decision to argue
waiver rather than the substantive issues not considered by the lower appellate court in the petition for discretionary review procedurally defaulted the substantive issues for federal court).
1s1Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 10 (1992) (noting that this is not the purpose of
the exhaustion doctrine); see also Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 281 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (expressing concern that the majority's holding that a claim was not properly presented to the state court and, thus, was not exhausted "is symptomatic of this Court's trend to
sidestep all possible controversies so, as it hopes, to let them disappear").
'n See Barry Friedman, FailedEnterprise:The Supreme Court'sHabeas Reform, 83 CAL.
L REV. 485, 541-43 (1995). Professor Friedman argues that the Supreme Court shifted the
focus of the federal habeas court from "the familiar and often easy task of determining the merits of constitutional claims" to "wad[ing] through a morass of new, complicated, and everchanging procedural rules." Id. at 541-42. This new approach, he concludes, actually puts more
strain on the entire system. See id. at 542-43.

234

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 51:201

tionary supreme court review from the exhaustion requirement, the
federal court should allow the state to do this, but it should warn the
state not to try to remove areas that are necessary to facilitate federal
court review or that will cause a drastic increase in federal court
caseloads. Comity suggests that the two systems respect the interests
of each other in this manner. A state supreme court that is willing to
live within these parameters should be permitted to say "thanks but no
thanks" to the federal habeas requirement that discretionary supreme
court review must be sought by a state prisoner to exhaust his or her
state remedies.

